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INTERVIEW WITH KHALED BEYDOUN*
Hosted by Nina Mozeihem** and Samuel Bagenstos***
The following is a transcription of an interview with Professor Khaled 
Beydoun, conducted at the University of Michigan Law School on March 
15, 2019. The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.
K. Beydoun: Thank you so much for having me. I really appreci-
ate the Journal organizing this event.
To you students here today, obviously this event comes at a very 
difficult time.
Today in New Zealand at two Christchurch mosques, there was 
another Islamophobic massacre that took place.1 It was led by a 
couple of perpetrators, specifically one who wrote a [seventy-four]2
page manifesto pushing a clash of civilizations crusade against the 
Muslim population in New Zealand and more broadly across the 
world. Forty-nine people were killed, and many more people were 
injured during Jumu’ah. Today is Jumu’ah, which is the holy day 
for Muslims—the Sabbath, if you will.
Today’s event comes at a really poignant but timely moment to 
discuss my book American Islamophobia: Understanding The Roots and 
Rise of Fear, which looks to grapple with why events like this are tak-
ing place and looks to grapple with how the political moment, and 
specifically political actors like our president, are in fact inciting 
and emboldening these types of acts, not only in the United States 
but across the world.3
In the book, I define Islamophobia in a very specific way. I wrote 
an article a couple of years back in the Columbia Law Review 
which theorizes what Islamophobia is and what it encompasses.4
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law; Senior Affiliated Faculty, 
University of California at Berkeley, Islamophobia Research & Documentation Project 
(IRDP) 
** J.D. Candidate, December 2019, University of Michigan Law School
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1. Max Walden, New Zealand Mosque Attacks: Who Is Brenton Tarrant?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 
17, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealand-mosque-attacks-brenton-
tarrant-190316093149803.html.
2. Professor Beydoun cited the length of the manifesto to be eighty-seven pages, but
reports seem to confirm the accurate length was seventy-four pages. See Jane Coaston, The 
New Zealand Shooter’s Manifesto Shows How White Nationalist Rhetoric Spreads, VOX (Mar. 18, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/3/15/18267163/new-zealand-shooting-
christchurch-white-nationalism-racism-language.
3. See generally KHALED A. BEYDOUN, AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: UNDERSTANDING THE 
ROOTS AND RISE OF FEAR (2018).
4. Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamaphobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 108 (2016).
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The basic definition is that Islamophobia is the presumption that 
expressions of Muslim identity are correlated with a propensity for 
terrorism. I delineate Islamophobia into three forms: private Is-
lamophobia, structural—state sponsored Islamophobia—and final-
ly, and I think most importantly for today, dialectical Islamopho-
bia, which is the process and the discourse whereby state action 
and state rhetoric go on to authorize the kind of mass violence that 
we see very vividly in places like New Zealand.
N. Mozeihem: What prompted you to write this book?
K. Beydoun: There were two main catalysts.
First, I have been a law professor for six years. I have spent much 
of my tenure as a professor writing on the War on Terror. I have 
been writing on how specific War on Terror policy has affected 
Muslim Americans in the way they express their religious identity 
and the way they go about exercising their religion—that kind of 
dialectic between state policy but also responses from Muslim 
communities.
And I realized as a law professor, that few people read law review 
articles [laughter]—my work was not penetrating into the com-
munity and audiences that I wanted to reach. We spend a lot of 
time trying to write articles and to get them placed in good jour-
nals, but our audience is very small and elite. I came to the realiza-
tion that I wanted my work to be read by a broader audience, and 
that intersected with the rise of Trump as a candidate. The specific 
day on which I decided to write this book, and to write an accessi-
ble book, was December 7, 2015. That was the day that then-
candidate Trump announced that it was his objective to put a stop 
on the entry of Muslims.5
The Muslim ban, as it came to be known, drove me to want to 
write this book. Then I came back to Detroit, where I grew up, and 
I realized what kind of effect that this brazen rhetoric from the 
President was having on the community. This book, God willing, 
inshallah, was able to speak to the experiences of Muslims on the 
ground.
S. Bagenstos: I thought the book was terrific. It does a great job 
of highlighting what Islamophobia is, what it isn’t, and the ways we 
have to confront it. You do a great job of both identifying what Is-
lamophobia is today, but also talking about the historical anteced-
ents to and roots of it.
5. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for “Total and Complete” Shutdown of Muslims Entering the 
United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-
entering-the-united-states/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.52e1ae072780. 
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Could you talk about how it has changed over time? Because it 
was striking to me, when I read your book, that we think about this 
manifestation of Islamophobia today as very much about terror 
rhetoric, particularly post 9/11. But Islamophobia existed for a 
very long time before 9/11.
K. Beydoun: For me, what was vital to illustrate in the book, but 
also in my broader advocacy, is that Islamophobia is not a new 
phenomenon. It was being framed as such with the rise of Trump 
because of his explicit rhetoric and his brazen overtures. But being 
a student of Edward Said and reading Orientalism, the way in which 
Edward Said laid out Orientalism, is this master discourse that ef-
fectively goes about vilifying Islam, goes about vilifying the “Orient” 
in mirror opposite term of the “West” or the “Occident.”6 It lays 
the foundation and embeds the kind of stereotypes and tropes that 
drive how we go about demonizing Islam and vilifying Muslims to-
day.
There was an important article by a law scholar named Leti 
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, that was published in the imme-
diate wake of the 9/11 terror attacks.7 In the thesis of that article, 
she argues that the 9/11 terror attacks led to the redeployment of 
Orientalist tropes. That thesis brilliantly captures the flashpoint 
when we see Orientalism evolving into the modern form of Islam-
ophobia we have today.
Even though the political threats change over time—in the 
eighties, the primary manifestation of Islamic threat was the Irani-
an government, with the rise of the Islamic Revolution of Khomei-
ni—and even though the political face has changed, the stereo-
types and tropes that drive the underlying fear are very much the 
same and rooted in what Said theorizes as Orientalism.
N. Mozeihem: Can you flesh out more about the differences be-
tween private, structural, and dialectical Islamophobia?
K. Beydoun: It is important to think about Islamophobia in 
these three forms.
The media tends to fixate, and the media will continue to fixate 
with what happened today, on private Islamophobia. That is the 
form that is inflicted by private actors: private citizens who inflict 
or unleash mass violence because of specific ideas or individual 
hate that they might have.
Second, we have structural Islamophobia. This is the more criti-
cal form and the form that is seldom discussed, both in the legal 
literature but also in the broader public discourse. There has been 
little framing of War on Terror policy after 9/11, but even more 
6. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
7. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
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recently, as a form of Islamophobia that we have to be concerned 
with and reckon with, but also a form of Islamophobia that drives 
private action.
When we think about structural Islamophobia, it is key to think 
about structural reform of the counterterror state that happened 
in the immediate wake of 9/11—the creation of The Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and policies like the Patriot Act;8 pol-
icies like the National Security Entry Exit Registration System 
(NSEERS),9 which was the Muslim registry before Trump an-
nounced that he wanted to enact a Muslim registry. So we have 
structural Islamophobia being spearheaded by conservative gov-
ernments, but we also have structural Islamophobia being ad-
vanced by Democratic administrations.
I write about how the radicalization in policing, surveillance 
within Muslim communities, is the most nefarious form of struc-
tural Islamophobia.10 That was enacted and established under the 
Obama administration (in 2011). Once we grapple with structural 
Islamophobia as being something that can be conspicuous or la-
tent, we understand that Islamophobia is not limited to right wing 
conservative actors. In the same way we think about racism in the 
Equal Protection context, we have facial discrimination which is 
typically advanced by elements on the right; however, there is la-
tent discrimination that has a disproportionate impact, which is of-
tentimes advanced by the left or center. It is key to think about Is-
lamophobia in that way as well.
S. Bagenstos: How would you connect Islamophobia to other 
kinds of structural bias or discrimination? We had this recent fight 
in American politics about a resolution in Congress that condemns 
anti-Semitism, and it becoming a broader resolution condemning 
many things, including Islamophobia.11 Many people until this 
morning, I think, were making fun of that politically, and now 
maybe they see how important it was to broaden that resolution. 
But I wonder in what ways are these biases all connected. There are 
obviously threads we can we can draw between them, but there are 
obviously differences as well.
K. Beydoun: There is an interesting dissonance between talking 
about these different forms of animus in a genuine way, and 
there’s a political conversation where they’re skewed because, to 
8. Jason Villemez, 9/11 to Now: Ways We Have Changed, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 14, 
2011), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/911-to-now-ways-we-have-changed.
9. National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, ARAB AM. INST.,
http://www.aaiusa.org/nseers (last visited May 10, 2019).
10. Khaled A. Beydoun, America, Islam, and Constitutionalism: Muslim American Poverty 
and the Mounting Police State, 31 J. L. & RELIGION 279 (2016).
11. H.R. 183, 116th Cong. (2019).
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be frank, there’s greater weight given to different forms of animus, 
especially within walls of power, like government.
But once we think about and connect Islamophobia and anti-
Semitism to anti-black racism and xenophobia and so on and have 
a theoretical discussion specifically within the context of American 
legal history, we see that there are not only bridges, but in fact, the 
very crux or foundation that gives rise to these distinct forms of an-
imus are one in the same.
An important starting off point is an act that was put in place a 
couple of years after the enactment of the Constitution called the 
Naturalization Act of 1790.12 This law stood in place until 1952. It 
mandated whiteness as a prerequisite for citizenship. You had to be 
white to become a naturalized citizen in the United States. White-
ness was not framed and construed in the way it is thought of to-
day. Whiteness was framed really narrowly; initially speaking, it was 
almost synonymous with Protestantism. As a consequence of that, a 
whole host of individuals both of color but also religious minori-
ties, were cast out of the legal definition of white. Jews, up until the 
early twentieth century, were not thought of as bona fide whites. 
Catholics were not thought of as bona fide whites. Italians, Slavs, a 
whole host of people that we embrace as formal whites today, were 
viewed to be beyond the scope of whiteness.13
So we see in that sense how per se anti-Semitism, driven by very 
narrow conceptions of American identity, formed how we thought 
about citizenship. There’s this great book by law scholar Linda 
Bosniak called The Citizen and the Alien, where she talks about strati-
fied citizenship drawn along racial and religious lines.14
Today when we have the uptick in anti-Semitism, when we have 
the uptick in Islamophobia, these are taking place and they’re not 
rising within a political vacuum. They’re rising from a specific un-
derbelly of the American legal imagination and history which 
makes them easy to deploy very swiftly when we have a character 
like Trump at the top who is unleashing the kind of rhetoric that 
facilitates and maximizes that kind of rhetoric.
People in the advocacy space talk about white supremacy—
that’s kind of become a kitsch term, which for me is great because 
12. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103, (repealed 1952) (“That any alien, 
being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen 
thereof, on application to any common law court of record, in any one of the states wherein 
he shall have resided for the term of one year at least . . . .”).
13. Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American 
Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2013). 
14. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP (2006).
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I’m a critical race theorist. But that’s in fact true. There is this vac-
illating conception of who is and who isn’t white, and individuals 
who are advocates of white supremacy view whiteness as being syn-
onymous with citizenship. They oftentimes don’t view Jews, immi-
grants, or individuals who adopt their specific ideology as being le-
gitimate whites or legitimate citizens. This is very much the crux 
that gives rise to these distinct forms of bigotry, Islamophobia, anti-
Semitism, xenophobia, and so forth and so on.
S. Bagenstos: One of the other interesting points from your 
book that connects to that point is that there’s a degree to which 
Islamophobia faces a lot of distinctions within Islam. And so you 
have this very quick move from people who look at what Islam is 
and they think it’s Arab. When in fact many Muslims in America 
aren’t of Arab extraction, many are of South Asian extraction, 
many are African-Americans whose families either came from West 
India or came here as slaves. There’s also this increasing Latino 
population as you talk about at the very beginning the book—in a 
very interesting vignette. What can you say, as a critical race theo-
rist, about connections across these different axes of identity?
K. Beydoun: Great question! This is something that I grapple 
with in the book, but also something that I grapple with more 
broadly. I think the most damning component of Islamophobia is 
that it is driven by racialized caricature of who Muslims are. We 
think about Muslims as being narrowly Arab or Middle Eastern, 
brown, and immigrant. There’s a specific racial caricature that is 
very much the foundation of Islamophobia, specifically private Is-
lamophobia.
I think the state has become far more intelligent in understand-
ing the racial, ethnic, even sectarian distinctions amongst the 
broader Muslim American population. But within the private 
mind—I don’t want to construct an archetypal Islamophobe—but 
within the private Islamophobic mind, there is this idea that Mus-
lims are exclusively Arab, immigrant and brown, which smacks 
against statistics specifically within the Muslim American milieu.
Professor Bagenstos talked about how the biggest plurality of 
Muslims today are in fact black, they’re African-American. If you 
understand American history, that shouldn’t be surprising—fifteen 
to thirty percent of enslaved Africans in this country came as Mus-
lims and continued to practice Islam while bonded to slavery.15 The 
Nation of Islam:we have that history of black Muslim movements 
15. Besheer Mohamed & Jeff Diamant, Black Muslims Account for a Fifth of All U.S. Mus-
lims, and About Half Are Converts to Islam, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/black-muslims-account-for-a-fifth-of-
all-u-s-muslims-and-about-half-are-converts-to-islam/.
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that preceded the entry of Muslim immigrants by at least five dec-
ades.16 Still today, if you look at conversion rates in the largest 
growing segments of the Muslim American population, they are 
Latino and white.17
Muslim-America, ironically enough, is a microcosm for broader 
American society. It’s the most diverse faith. It’s the most ethnically 
racially heterogeneous.18 Arabs and Middle Eastern Muslims are in 
fact the third biggest plurality. The stereotype clashes strongly with 
the demographic steps.
N. Mozeihem: We’ve seen recently with Representative Ilhan 
Omar, that a lot of people have been alleging Islamophobia and 
the intense criticism to which she has been subjected.19 Do you 
have any comments on that? How do you think Islamophobia has 
played a role in the criticism both she and Representative Rashida 
Tlaib have been receiving?
K. Beydoun: I know Ilhan, and I can tell you that Ilhan is a deep-
ly spiritual person. She’s a pioneer in the sense that she’s the first 
muhajabah—she’s the first Muslim American congresswoman to be 
in that space and to wear the hijab.20
There was a provision that Congress had that restricted individ-
uals from wearing hats.21 She had to overcome that initial hurdle. It 
wasn’t a facially discriminatory provision; it was effectively one that 
was related to decorum. But she occupies and she embodies this 
challenging intersection in terms of what her identity is—she’s 
black, she’s Somali, she’s a refugee, she’s a Muslima, she’s a con-
spicuous Muslima, she’s really progressive and unapologetic about 
her progressive views. So she’s a threat to a disparate number of el-
ements within not only Congress but within that power space in 
16. Tynetta Muhammad, Brief history on origin of the Nation of Islam, NATION OF ISLAM
(Mar. 28, 1996), https://www.noi.org/noi-history/.
17. Tim Padgett, Why So Many Latinos Are Becoming Muslims, WLRN (Oct. 9, 2013),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/why-so-many-latinos-are-becoming-muslims.
18. Demographic Portrait of Muslim Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2017),
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/.
19. See Cody Nelson, Minnesota Congresswoman Ignites Debate On Israel And Anti-Semitism,
NPR (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/700901834/minnesota-
congresswoman-ignites-debate-on-israel-and-anti-semitism; see also Michelle Goldberg, Ilhan 
Omar’s Microaggression: Her Words Were Bad. The Reaction Was Worse., N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/opinion/ilhan-omar-antisemitism-
democrats.html.
20. Andy Sullivan, Minnesota, Michigan Send First Muslim Women to U.S. Congress, REUTERS
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-islam-women/minnesota-
michigan-send-first-muslim-women-to-u-s-congress-idUSKCN1NC095; see also Katherine Tul-
ly-McManus, After 181 Years of No Hats in Congress, Dems Eye Exception for Religious Garb, ROLL 
CALL (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/hats-congress-religious-garb-
exception.
21. The Ban on Hats on the House Floor, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1800-1850/The-debate-over-the-rule-to-
ban-hats-on-the-House-Floor/ (last visited May 10, 2019).
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Washington, D.C. because of who she is and because she’s made it 
a point to speak unapologetically about her views.
Now, I’ll be frank, I think that the way she framed some of her 
critiques of Israel22 were not the most intelligently framed. Howev-
er, she’s a green Congresswoman who is new in that space. The re-
ality is this: there is a small, narrow, or no margin of error at all be-
cause of who she is. Somebody else who has that same sort of 
circumstance, being a green rookie congressperson, will be ex-
tended a lot in a margin of error. But because the microscope is 
being positioned so tightly upon every step she makes—and that’s 
true for Rashida as well, a congressperson from Detroit23—by virtue 
of who they are, they have little room for mistakes or missteps.
N. Mozeihem: In light of that, how would you interpret the rise 
of Muslim candidates for office and in the United States, with both 
Rashida and Ilhan being the first Muslim women in Congress, and 
even here in Michigan we saw Abdul El-Sayed24 running for gover-
nor.
K. Beydoun: First of all, I love the fact that our most visible lead-
ership, not only within government but in the civil rights spaces 
and within academia, are Muslim women. In the book, I write 
about how Muslim women are very much spearheading this new 
Muslim American Renaissance or reawakening.
What I love about it is that it de-mystifies one of the core tropes 
that are assigned on Muslim American identity, and specifically 
Muslim American men, that we’re this patriarchal, aggressive, vio-
lent element that is keen on subordinating Muslim American 
woman. But the trenchant, unapologetic, and resilient examples 
being set forth by people like Rashida and Ilhan erode those stere-
otypes.
I think it’s a great thing! For me it’s empowering. I went to col-
lege here, and I can remember people looked at me crazy when I 
told them that I wanted to go to law school. If you are Muslim 
American, you’re either an engineer or a doctor, so [Nina and I] 
disappointed our parents because we didn’t go on to become doc-
tors. It was rare, and now that we see Muslim Americans rising and 
running for office, it’s a beautiful thing. And I wouldn’t limit it 
22. See BUSBOY & POETS, (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/
busboysandpoets/videos/353129905294312/. See also Karen Zraick, Ilhan Omar’s Latest Re-
marks on Israel Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/01/us/politics/ilhan-omar-israel.html.
23. CONGRESSWOMAN RASHIDA TLAIB, https://tlaib.house.gov/ (last visited May 10, 
2019).
24. Stateside Staff, For Abdul El-Sayed, “The Path Hasn’t Changed” Despite Primary Loss,
MICH. RADIO (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/abdul-el-sayed-path-
hasnt-changed-despite-primary-loss.
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specifically to Trump. I think that’s a sellable talking point in the 
media space, that they’re running for office because of Trump, but 
I think it shows a maturation or evolution within the community 
that Muslim Americans are beginning to realize the importance of 
running for office.
And I wish Abdul [El-Sayed] would have won. I wish Professor 
Bagenstos would have won his race to be part of the Michigan Su-
preme Court.25 And I think they will win in the future, so hopefully 
it’s not their only races.
Another thing worth noting is that one thing I’m struggling with 
right now is this emergence of, what I call, extreme identity politics 
on the left and right. It is important that we support candidates 
who look and believe like us. But I think it’s more important for 
candidates to stand up for principles, progressive principles, that 
advance the interests of not only marginalized minorities but mar-
ginalized segments of people at large. I would vote for a non-
Muslim candidate who is supportive of free exercise of religion and 
inclusion over a conservative Muslim candidate. I just re-read this 
article by Professor Nancy Leong called Racial Capitalism, which 
warns against this fixation that is prevalent on the right, but also 
present on the left, to only champion a person’s identity and sup-
planting the importance of identity with the importance of sub-
stance.26
S. Bagenstos: I want to get back to another thing you were talk-
ing about, which is also an important point in the book, which is 
that it’s not just Trump. We’re talking about a policy level of this, 
part of structural Islamophobia. It is even Democratic administra-
tions, like Barack Obama’s administration.
First, why is that? One way of thinking about Obama is that he 
was elected, in part, as a reaction to what were perceived to be ex-
cesses of War on Terror rhetoric and policy in the Bush admin-
istration.27 And yet as you point out, he both reified some of the 
stuff that was already there and created a bunch of new stuff that 
raises problems. Second, how do we avoid that in the future?
K. Beydoun: I was a strong supporter of candidate Obama’s race 
in 2008. Like most people, probably most people in this room, I 
was inspired by him becoming the first black president. For me it 
signaled, perhaps naively at that point, a shift in this country’s ra-
cial make-up toward the better. But then during his presidency, I 
25. SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: JUSTICE FOR ALL, https://www.bagenstosforjustice.com/ (last 
visited May 10, 2019).
26. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013); see also Nancy 
Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1333 (2016). 
27. See, e.g., Trevor McCrisken, Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and 
Practice, 87 ROYAL INST. INT’L AFF. 781 (2011).
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began to realize that, regardless of the nature of the administra-
tion, that power is wed to perpetuating the War on Terror both 
domestically and globally because it advances very coveted eco-
nomic, political, and perhaps even epistemological interests for the 
state.
I say that to highlight the point that Islamophobia is not only ir-
rational. We tend to think about it, and it’s broadly framed as irra-
tional action or hatred, but grappling with structural Islamophobia 
reveals that it’s also rational. It’s used as a tool, whether it be law, 
whether it be foreign policy, whether it be brokering relationships 
with specific nation states that are the most damaging, like Saudi 
Arabia for instance.
These are strategic expedients the state uses to carry forward 
specific objectives. One of them in the region for instance, the rea-
son we are keen on maintaining instability in the “Muslim world” 
regardless of whether we have a Republican or Democratic admin-
istration, is because that instability advances our ability to access 
oil. It advances our ability to keep tabs on nation states. It advances 
our ability to further American foreign policy and influence in the 
region. It’s rational in that sense.
In the Obama administration, even though President Obama 
walks in—I’m half Egyptian, I was inspired when he walked into—
Al-Azhar, a University in Cairo and gave his beautiful speech 
months after he was elected.28 The thesis of that speech effectively 
was: it’s my job to mend the wounds of the War on Terror inflicted 
by the Bush administration and broker a new peace between the 
West and Islam. He was still kind of capitalizing on this Samuel 
Huntington clash of civilizations type framing and rhetoric that 
was problematic. Yet it signaled promise.
However, as the administration advanced and began to reveal it-
self, it became clear that that rhetoric was only a tool to advance 
his specific form of War on Terror policy and the signature of his 
administration was counter-radicalization policing. That’s why 
President Obama did not walk into an American mosque until sev-
en years into his administration. He was afraid that he was being 
pegged a Muslim by the Right—that was one of the reasons why. 
But second, he only found it fruitful and conducive to engage with 
Muslims and Muslim Americans as a selling point for counter radi-
calization because counter radicalization is built upon this struc-
ture where the state needs to work with Muslims as informants, in-
terlocutors, and stakeholders within the community to advance 
28. C-SPAN, President Obama Speech to Muslim World in Cairo, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_889oBKkNU.
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surveillance. In the same way that COINTELPRO functioned in the 
sixties;29 it’s the exact same model.
The rhetoric Obama used was beautiful, it was accepting, it was 
tolerant, but it was characterized by dissidents in very destructive 
policy.
S. Bagenstos: What would a good president on these issues look 
like? What would a good administration on these issues look like?
K. Beydoun: The ideal would be dismantling and doing away 
with the War on Terror. Statistically speaking, there has been no 
bona fide threat from Muslim Americans. This whole concept of 
homegrown radicalization, which the state peddles, is not based in 
anything tangible. It’s all scare tactics. I analogize it to modern day 
eugenics. There is this belief that there is something inherently vi-
olent about Muslim identity that drives these fears. The first step 
would be dismantling and doing away with the War on Terror.
I’m a Bernie Sanders guy. I’m going to be a surrogate for his 
campaign again this go around, because I believe in his foreign 
policy— a less interventionist, more hands-off engagement with 
the region. Most saliently, retrenching relationships with Saudi 
Arabia. If you want to hone in on one nation state that is the great-
est abettor and aider of terrorism, it would be them. Their form of 
Islamic interpretation, Wahhabism, is what drives the ideology of 
ISIS, al Qaida, Al Shababb in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, so 
on and so forth.30 You can track how petrol dollars have given rise 
to the growth of these frightening terror networks across the
world. However, they are our primary ally in the region, especially 
this new, whacko Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) who fashions 
himself as a Saudi Arabian Trump.31
That’s what I would do—retrench the War on Terror enterprise 
and rethink our foreign policy, specifically our relationships with 
countries like Saudi Arabia.
29. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COINTELPRO, https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro
(last visited May 10, 2019) (compiling the surveillance activities of COINTELPRO over a 
fifteen year period which included monitoring of members of the civil rights movement); see
also Betty Medsger, Just Being Black Was Enough to Get Yourself Spied on by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI,
NATION (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/just-being-black-was-enough-
get-yourself-spied-j-edgar-hoovers-fbi/.
30. See OXFORD ISLAMIC STUD. ONLINE, Wahhabis, http://www.oxford
islamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2467 (last visited May 10, 2019) (providing a quick 
summary and history of the Wahhabism); see also Christopher M. Blanchard, The Islamic Tra-
ditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, CONG. REP. SERV., https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS21695.pdf (last updated Jan. 24, 2008) (providing a more in-depth summary of the histo-
ry of Wahhabism and present-day issues).
31. Frank Gardner, Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince MBS Takes Charm Offensive East, BBC
NEWS (Feb 26, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47361745 (describing 
MBS’ recent actions in and outside Saudi Arabia).
914 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 52:4
They’re probably not going to let me in when I try to do the pil-
grimage in a couple of years. If they read my Twitter, they definite-
ly won’t let me in.32
N. Mozeihem: In terms of dismantling Islamophobia, more on 
the private sphere, do you think that starts with talking about struc-
tural Islamophobia and dealing with that before you can transition 
to societal conceptions that lead to private Islamophobia?
K. Beydoun: That’s a hard question. I speak to so many different 
audiences about this, and I sometimes struggle with what to lead 
with.
It’s easy with you guys because you guys are lawyers and future 
lawyers, so we can understand how the law functions. But I just 
spoke at Oregon State University with a largely undergraduate au-
dience, and you have to reel them in with the private Islamophobia 
because that’s what they know. They consume what they know 
through mainstream but also social media. It’s easier for non-legal 
audiences to work with a visual embodiment of who Islamophobes 
are. Trump makes perfect sense because of his brazen rhetoric; in-
dividual actors like these terrorists in New Zealand are good start-
ing off point. Then you segue into the law. But because of the edu-
cation in the room today, I would flip the script and lead with 
structural Islamophobia and lead with the law.
N. Mozeihem: Speaking of the terrorist attack in New Zealand, 
how much do you think right wing hate speech—that manifests it-
self in clear Islamophobia, according to your book—how much do 
you think that plays a role in manifesting in violence against Mus-
lims?
K. Beydoun: It’s clear. The Australian terrorists who committed
those acts at the Christchurch mosque made it manifestly clear. He 
wrote this [seventy-four] page manifesto, he called Trump, he said 
that Trump inspired him, that he was reawakening a kind of new 
white identity, he talked about how it was his objective to bring 
about a civil war, a crusade against Muslims in New Zealand.
[Seventy-four] pages.
When these guys are writing manifestos, whether it be Islam-
ophobia or anti-black racists like Dylan Roof, 33 they’ve spent a lot 
of time thinking about this stuff and writing about this stuff. These 
are premeditated actions. I think it’s critical for us to understand
that.
32. See generally Khaled Beydoun (@KhaledBeydoun), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
KhaledBeydoun?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor.
33. Alan Binder & Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof Is Sentenced to Death in Charleston Church Mas-
sacre, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/dylann-roof-
trial-charleston.html.
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Why I talk about Islamophobia as a dialectic—that the words 
from people like Trump isn’t only political rhetoric, it is strategi-
cally used to mobilize voters. That might be the most imminent 
short-term objective, but it also has to be viewed as a call to action. 
It is irresponsible for a politician to not think that there are hateful 
elements on the ground who are going to interpret that language 
as an authorization to inflict vigilante violence against elements of 
the community that the President has cast as being subhuman, in-
ferior, or inherently violent.
These acts, to be frank with you, are not surprising me. I’m 
numb to them now because they happen so often. We live in a po-
litical landscape where bigots like Trump are being lauded and 
championed by these culprits as an inspiration, and the unfortu-
nate reality is that just as long as we have elements like him in high 
office, it’s going to continue.
Q&A WITH STUDENT AUDIENCE
Student Question: You mentioned Saudi Arabia being the wrong 
key ally in the region. How else would you envision an ideal for-
eign policy for the United States in that region?
K. Beydoun: This is the clash: how do we reconcile countries 
that have great economic stake with us with the interest in not 
aligning ourselves fully with nations that have been exporting 
harmful ideology. Not only harmful ideology, but a country that is 
perhaps antithetical to American values in terms of how they go 
about treating their own citizenry. There’s no tolerance for reli-
gious minorities, there’s clearly no emphasis on women’s rights—
women can’t drive in that country—there’s no tolerance for dissi-
dents, academic freedom, so on and so forth. So apart from Saudi 
Arabia being keen on exporting Wahabi Islam to its petrol dollars, 
it’s also a very undemocratic and tyrannical country.
I’m not naïve. I know that nation states like the United States 
are rational actors where economic interests mean a great deal and 
the nature of the administration can have a great deal of impact on 
how we go about negotiating our relationship with countries like 
Saudi Arabia. I am very critical of President Obama; however, I 
think that President Obama would navigate his relationship dra-
matically differently than President Trump. Because of MBS, being 
such a violent brazen, autocrat, I think Obama would have re-
thought the nature of the relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Moving forward, we have to realize and affectively do an ac-
counting of what is the economic net gain justifying the political 
loss accrued by having this relationship with Saudi Arabia. If this 
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government is truly genuine about its global War on Terror and 
retrenching it, then the most immediate solution is to rethink the 
relationship with countries like Saudi Arabia. However, that’s why I 
think that there is no genuine interest on the part of brass within 
the State Department or the executive to retrench the War on Ter-
ror. I think that there are rational benefits that are gained through 
perpetuating this global idea that Muslims are menacing and will-
ing to destroy the United States, even though statistics don’t prove 
that. If you look at ISIS for instance, ninety-nine percent of ISIS 
victims are Muslims.34 ISIS has not posed itself to be a real threat to 
the United States.
I wrote a series of articles on counter radicalization policing, this 
programming that is established in places like Minneapolis, Los 
Angeles, Boston, but also informally in places like Detroit.35 The 
cases where they’ve identified homegrown radicals have either 
been fabricated or trumped up, embellished investigations.
I’m not sure if [the administration is] being genuine, but I guess 
and think that they’re not. Foreign policy is deeply connected with 
the way we go about steering our domestic anti-terror program.
Student Question: Do you find that there is a unique American 
strand of Islamophobia? Or because of the internet and social me-
dia, has Islamophobia been exported globally?
K. Beydoun: There definitely is a uniquely American strand that 
is distinct from the way Islamophobia is unfolding in places like 
France, China, and India, because of the way we think about who 
Muslims are.
If you go to France, for instance, I would venture to say that Is-
lamophobia is comparatively more intense than it is in the United 
States because of the geographic proximity of Muslim majority 
countries but also the recent colonial history that France has in 
places like Algeria, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa, and so on 
and so forth. But in France, the caricaturing of Muslim identity is 
broader in nature. There isn’t this idea that Muslims are only Ar-
abs or Middle Easterners. Black Muslims who come from countries 
like Chad and Cameroon also pose the same kind of Islamophobia 
threat in a country like France that an Algerian or a Moroccan 
Muslim might in that country. It’s framed more along religious 
terms, where in the United States it’s a bit more racialized.
34. Anthony Cordesman, Islam and the Patterns in Terrorism and Violent Extremism, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/islam-and-patterns-
terrorism-and-violent-extremism (“Almost all of the human impact of extremist attacks is 
Muslims killing or injuring fellow Muslims.”).
35. See, e.g., Khaled Beydoun, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes, and Double Standards, 112 
NW. U. L. REV. 117 (2018); Khaled Beydoun Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: Poor 
and Muslim in “War on Terror” America, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1463 (2016).
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American Islamophobia is driven more by racial identity. We can 
see that through the victimization of Sikh men. It’s oftentimes Sikh 
men, because of their religious presentation, that are the primary 
victims of private Islamophobic violence. That was true after 9/11
We had a string of attacks against Sikh men and the broader com-
munity because it’s driven in the United States by more of a racial 
imagining of who Muslims are.36
In places like France, more religious, India, very religious, so it’s 
Hindus who look exactly like Indian Muslims might look and driv-
en again by religion.
In places like China, it’s more complex. You might have heard 
of what’s happening in China with the internment of the Uighur 
Muslims;37 it’s driven by religion. That’s a country where atheism is 
enshrined. But also it’s political in the sense that Uighur Muslims 
want their own nation state and the status capitalizing on, ironical-
ly enough, the adoption of American War on Terror terminology 
to cast Uighur Muslims as presumptive terrorists to religiously per-
secute them but also deflate the possibility of them having their 
own nation state.
Islamophobia looks differently and unfolds differently in line 
with the characteristics of its host state. Which is why I wrote a 
book on American Islamophobia, because it would sound really dis-
jointed if it was Islamophobia more broadly.
Student Question: What are some of the difficulties with discrim-
ination against Islam, given that Islam is not only an identity that 
people carry, but also something you believe in and carries a set of 
beliefs as well. And the rhetoric bounces around from statements 
that are clearly facially racist to some that address belief and prac-
tice. This takes us from discussing xenophobia to ideology, a de-
bate about racism to a debate about what my group believes versus 
what your group believes.
Can you talk about that dynamic and what makes Islamophobia 
unique in that sense?
K. Beydoun: Islamophobia is unique in the sense that it does 
blur the lines between race and religion.
36. Fact Sheet on Post-9/11 Discrimination and Violence against Sikh Americans, SIKH 
COALITION,
https://www.sikhcoalition.org/images/documents/fact%20sheet%20on%20hate%20agains
t%20sikhs%20in%20america%20post%209-11%201.pdf (last visited May 10, 2019).
37. Chris Buckley & Amy Qin, Muslim Detention Camps Are Like ‘Boarding Schools,’ Chinese 
Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/world/
asia/china-xinjiang.html.
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I just wrote this article, Faith in Whiteness, which challenges the 
idea that race and religion are distinct ideas or distinct identities.38
In this country’s history religion has always been racialized, wheth-
er it be Islam, Catholicism, Judaism, and so on and so forth. And 
we see how that blurring of race and religion takes place within the 
broader popular discourse.
You’re right, I think that this is a conversation that’s happening 
specifically within the Muslim American community, so I don’t 
want to let our bad laundry out. But I will say that there is this ten-
sion between this emergence of assuming a political Muslim identi-
ty as a consequence of 9/11 and the rise of Trump, with Islam be-
ing framed specifically as a belief system. However, that internal 
conversation, if you map it with what’s happening more broadly 
speaking, can be messy and the Fox News host you mentioned 
doesn’t necessarily see a distinction because her understanding 
and framing of Islam is not necessarily as a religion, not necessarily 
as a race, but as a rival civilization. The Right views Islam often-
times not as a bona fide religion but as a political ideology, a polit-
ical movement, and a rival civilization.
So when you listen to Fox News—younger folks, if you listen to 
Ben Shapiro on the right or you listen to Bill Maher on the left—
they seldom talk about Islam as being a bona fide religion that is 
worthy of free exercise protection. They view it as a political men-
ace that doesn’t deserve free exercise protection because by way of 
manifesting itself—whether it be through the hijab, Muslims col-
lectively congregating on days like today to go pray, Muslims run-
ning for office like Abdul El-Syed—their objective is to promote 
Sharia law and to erode and undermine the democratic values and 
virtues of this country.
The blurring of race and religion that takes place within the 
popular space is, whether consciously or subconsciously, driven by 
the idea that most critics don’t view Islam as a bona fide religion or 
religion worth protecting because it’s so tightly tied to the specter 
of imminent violence and threat. Again, this is a rhetoric not only 
coming from the right. It’s coming from elements on the left as 
well.
N. Mozeihem: I remember watching Bill Maher saying that Is-
lamophobia is not a thing, that it doesn’t exist.39
38. Khaled Beydoun, Faith in Whiteness: Free Exercise of Religion as Radical Expression, 105 
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
39. Raya Jalabi, A History of the Bill Maher’s ‘Not Bigoted’ Remarks on Islam, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
7, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2014/oct/06/bill-
maher-islam-ben-affleck (reviewing Bill Maher’s history of anti-Muslim comments).
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K. Beydoun: His bookers of the show wanted to invite me a cou-
ple of years back, and I struggled with whether to do it or not. I was 
a big fan of Bill Maher, and I agree with ninety percent of what he 
says. But it’s only when he talks about Muslims and Islam that I feel 
I’m not sure I can watch the show anymore.
Student Question: Since the Supreme Court’s decision last 
summer,40 a lot of the discussion about the Muslim Ban has slowed 
to a trickle. It there any hope of changing that other than getting a 
new president?
K. Beydoun: It has to be a new president because it’s an execu-
tive order. But the reality is that the composition of the Supreme 
Court might not change significantly, unless something dramatic 
happens and a Democratic president takes over.
The majority decision that Justice Roberts wrote was driven by a 
textualist reading of the third version of the order.41 It denied the 
importance of Trump’s rhetoric and also denied the language of 
the first and second versions of the Muslim Ban. In my opinion, 
the first version was facially discriminatory. By naming seven Mus-
lim majority countries and creating exceptions for religious minor-
ities, you can do the math then understand that it was specifically 
talking about Muslims.
That’s why I was a strong advocate of Professor Bagenstos’s cam-
paign. If in the imminent future we have Republicans dominating 
the executive and Supreme Court, then our only hope comes with-
in the state courts. So hopefully Trump is defeated by Sanders—
sorry, if there are supporters of other candidates in the room. 
There are many Democrats running for office now, and Beto just 
announced!42 But if Trump continues on with a second term, then 
things look bleak.
S. Bagenstos: Let me just say one thing about that and slightly 
hijack the point a little bit –
K. Beydoun: No pun intended.
[Laughter]
S. Bagenstos: I was worried about that. Fair enough.
For an audience of law students, it’s important, and it’s such a 
great point the last question raised. There was all this activism and 
energy around the Muslim ban, and then it all got channeled into 
a legal rhetoric in a legal strategy.
40. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
41. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
42. ROLLING STONE STAFF, The RS Politics of 2020 Democratic Primary Leaderboard,
ROLLINGSTONE (May 8, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/
2020-democrat-candidates-771735/; Politico Staff, Do you know the 2020 Democratic presidential 
candidates?, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/interactives/2019/2020-democratic-
presidential-candidates-list/ (last updated Apr. 22, 2019).
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We all started just listening to the folks who said, “this is uncon-
stitutional, and the courts are going to say so.” “John Roberts really 
wants to say that Korematsu was wrong and so does Anthony Kenne-
dy.” And it turns out that they were able to sign an opinion that 
said Korematsu is wrong, while upholding our modern-day Kore-
matsu. Honestly, Justice Black who wrote Korematsu could have said 
exactly the same thing [as the Roberts opinion] in the Korematsu
opinion.
Once everything got channeled into the courts and got chan-
neled into a legal strategy, much of the political energy around it 
dissipated. I think that’s a problem, and something as future law-
yers who care about issues of social justice, you want to think about: 
How do you use your legal skills and talents and the monopoly you 
have on going into court, which can be very useful, as a way of as-
sisting a social justice movement without dissipating a social justice 
movement, without taking away the energy of the movement?
It’s a great question precisely because the Muslim ban gives you 
a great example of legalization ending up kind of suppressing the 
movement.
Student Question: Given their failure to consider the history of 
the ban itself or Trump’s own rhetoric and the Court putting on 
blinders to the context, do you think there is still any use in legal 
remedies against this structural bias? Or at this point are we only 
really looking at solutions in the electorate?
K. Beydoun: I think now what’s going to happen in the interim 
is we are seeing a revitalization of anti-Sharia bans that are taking 
place and being peddled by politicians who are very much inspired 
by a clash of civilizations worldview and definitely emboldened by 
the moment.
Because we’re dealing with a majority conservative Supreme 
Court, these laws have to be explicitly discriminatory on their face 
in order for a legal remedy by the court to be exacted against this 
legislation. Legislators oftentimes are smart, oftentimes are not,
but on the second go around, they went about crafting the legisla-
tion in facially neutral terms which makes it very conducive for ma-
jority conservative courts, whether it be circuit courts or the Su-
preme Court, to go about upholding these laws.
I want to be optimistic. But I also want to not lie to you. Unless 
something dramatic happens on the national level, we’re going to 
see an entrenchment of what took place with the Trump v. Hawaii
case on the federal level.
Student Question: Movements against Islamophobia and Anti-
Semitism have a lot of the same qualities, but they are also in ten-
sion with one another—especially where missteps and words can 
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undermine cooperation. On an organizational level, how can 
groups like the Anti-Defamation League and Council on American-
Islamic Relations harness political energy and address these issues 
together at a time when it is very important to do so?
K. Beydoun: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are deeply con-
nected. They are forms of animus that have long entrenched histo-
ries in this country. There is strategic importance for Jewish leader-
ship and Muslim leadership to fight against these forms of animus.
What happened in New Zealand today looks just like what hap-
pened in Pittsburgh a couple of months back.43 It was carried out 
by the same kind of element.
The reality is one where there is a dividing point that is a foreign 
policy issue, which is the state of Israel and how to go about fram-
ing and resolving that issue. That is the primary stumbling block 
that is stifling, if not entirely undermining, these communities 
from working with one another.
I’m not a foreign policy guy, but I’m going to try to step out of 
my lane for a bit and give you an answer on that issue. To me, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a religious issue. Its framing as a 
religious issue by Jews and Muslims alike does a disservice to bring-
ing about a resolution. It is akin to what took place in South Africa, 
it is akin to what takes place in countries where there is a cogniza-
ble persecuted and subordinated people.
For Palestine, religion is used as a vehicle. It’s used as an instru-
ment by both sides to promote their own interests, whether it be 
Muslim countries using the Palestinian issue to mobilize their own 
following and interest in that country, or Israeli and Zionist ele-
ments domestically. To frame it as a religious issue, because the ob-
jective is political and it is the real objective, is not resolving that 
issue. We can see that issue bleeding into how Jewish American 
and Muslim American leadership interact, or don’t interact, 
around matters on which they have to build coalitions. Again, anti-
Semitism and Islamophobia, if not closely and intimately tied, are 
one in the same.
43. Campbell Robertson, et al., 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; Suspect Charged With 29 
Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/active-
shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html.

